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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Daniel Neal Montgomery appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of unlawful discharge of a firearm into an occupied
vehicle.

Montgomery contends the district court abused its discretion by

declining his request to exclude rebuttal witnesses who were not disclosed by the
state because, he argues, despite prior precedent holding otherwise, the plain
language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) requires disclosure of all witnesses. Montgomery
also contends, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument and that his conviction should be vacated
even if the alleged misconduct was harmless because he believes the
prosecutorial agency should be punished.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Montgomery with two counts of aggravated assault and
one count of unlawful discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle after
Montgomery confronted the occupants of a car at gunpoint, and fired shots at the
car, after the driver of the car drove recklessly through Montgomery’s
neighborhood. (R., pp.37-39.) The aggravated assault charge related to the
driver of the car, Tim Camacho, was dismissed at the conclusion of the
preliminary hearing due to a lack of sufficient evidence because Camacho did not
testify at the hearing. (R., pp.58, 60.) Montgomery proceeded to trial on the
aggravated assault charge related to the passenger, James Newell, and on the
unlawful discharge of a firearm allegation.

1

The jury acquitted Montgomery of the aggravated assault charge, but
found him guilty of unlawfully discharging his firearm into an occupied vehicle.
(R., pp.214-215.) The district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence, with
four years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Montgomery on
probation. (R., pp.225-228.) Montgomery timely appealed. (R., pp.233-235.)

2

ISSUES
Montgomery states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the
State’s non-disclosed witness to testify on rebuttal?

2.

Did the State violate Mr. Montgomery’s right to a fair trial by
committing prosecutorial misconduct?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Should this Court hold, consistent with prior precedent, that I.C.R. 16(b)(6)
does not require the state to disclose rebuttal witnesses prior to trial, and reject
Montgomery’s claim that the prior precedent is either not binding or should be
overruled?
2.
Has Montgomery failed to establish the prosecutor committed misconduct
in his rebuttal closing argument, much less that the alleged misconduct resulted
in fundamental error entitling him to reversal of his conviction? Should this Court
also reject Montgomery’s request to vacate his conviction in order to punish the
prosecutorial agency even if the alleged misconduct does not constitute
fundamental error because such a request is contrary to law?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Montgomery Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying Montgomery’s Request To Exclude The Testimony Of Two Of The
State’s Rebuttal Witnesses As A Sanction For Not Disclosing The Names Of
Those Witnesses Prior To Trial, And Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For
Overruling Prior Precedent That Holds The State Is Not Required To Disclose
Rebuttal Witnesses
A.

Introduction
Montgomery contends “the district court abused its discretion when it

allowed the State to present the testimony of two non-disclosed rebuttal
witnesses.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)

Montgomery “acknowledges that Idaho

Courts have previously held otherwise, but he maintains that these cases are
based solely upon the now amended statute, I.C. § 19-1302, and are either not
biding [sic] precedent or must be overturned.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)

Montgomery’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by following
precedent should be rejected, particularly since Montgomery failed to identify any
prejudice relating to the timing of the disclosure that would require exclusion.
Montgomery’s request that this Court either ignore or overrule prior cases holding
that the state is not required to disclose rebuttal witnesses should also be
rejected because that precedent is consistent with the plain language of I.C.R.
16(b)(6) and logic.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of

an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court.” State v.
Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 162 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State
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v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)); see also State
v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). “[T]he trial court’s
exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it
has been clearly abused.” State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416,
421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495, 496 (1977)).
C.

Facts Relevant To Montgomery’s Claimed Discovery Violation
Prior to trial, Montgomery filed a request for discovery pursuant to I.C.R.

16(b)(1)-(8), which included a request for the names of “all persons having
knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the prosecuting attorney as
witnesses at trial.” (Augmentation, pp.1-2.) The state filed responses to this
request on January 13, 2015, and March 20, 2015. (Augmentation, pp.5-8.) The
second response, which included all the names from the first response, listed 25
potential witnesses. (Augmentation, pp.7-8.) In its case-in-chief, however, the
state only called five witnesses. (See generally, Tr., Vol. I, pp.102-185, Tr., Vol.
II, pp.196-231.)
At the completion of the defense’s case-in-chief, the state called four
rebuttal witnesses – one of whom testified in the state’s case-in-chief (Officer
Jacob Nielsen), and three additional witnesses (Detective Johann Schmitz,
Deputy Michael Hart, and Detective Joshua Gillmore). (Tr., Vol. III, pp.368-425.)
One of the three rebuttal witnesses – Detective Schmitz – was included on the
state’s witness list (Augmentation, p.7), but the other two – Deputy Hart and
Detective Gillmore – were not (Augmentation, pp.7-8). The rebuttal witnesses
were called to rebut Montgomery’s claim in defense that he suffered injuries
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when he stood in front of Camacho’s car pointing a gun at him in an effort to
keep Camacho from driving away, and to rebut his claim that law enforcement
recovered all of the bullets he fired at Camacho’s car. (Compare Tr., Vol. II,
p.330, L.9 – p.331, L.8 (Montgomery testifying he had abdominal pain,
contusions, and a displaced hip from being hit by Camacho’s car), p.355, Ls.3-17
(Montgomery testifying he read police reports that five bullets were found) with
Tr., Vol. III, p.410, L.12 – p.411, L.5 (Deputy Hart testifying that, during booking
process, Montgomery denied any injuries), p.420, Ls.2-14 (Detective Gillmore
testifying he only found two bullets).)
Montgomery objected to the testimony of Deputy Hart and Detective
Gillmore and asked the court to exclude those witnesses as a discovery sanction
because their names were not included on the state’s witness list. (Tr., Vol. III,
p.391, L.14 – p.392, L.16.) The district court denied Montgomery’s requested
sanction for two reasons. First, the court relied on the principle cited in several
prior Idaho cases that the state does not have a duty to disclose rebuttal
witnesses. (Tr., Vol. III, p.397, L.23 – p.399, L.16.) Second, the court rejected
Montgomery’s request because Montgomery failed to identify any prejudice as a
result of the alleged late disclosure. (Tr., Vol. III, p.399, Ls.18-22.)
D.

Montgomery Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Request To Exclude Two Of The State’s
Rebuttal Witnesses Because That Decision Was Consistent With Idaho
Law
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. That rule

provides, in relevant part:
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Upon written request of the defendant the prosecuting attorney
shall furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and
addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who
may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial, together with
any record of prior felony convictions of any such person which is
within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney.
I.C.R. 16(b)(6).
The Idaho Criminal Rules took effect on July 1, 1980, and “apply to all
criminal actions” filed after that date.1 I.C.R. 59. Prior to the adoption of the
Idaho Criminal Rules, I.C. § 19-1302 provided:
All informations shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction of the
offense specified therein by the prosecuting attorney as informant;
he shall subscribe his name thereto and indorse thereon the names
of the witnesses known to him at the time of filing the same; and at
such time before the trial of any case as the court may rule or
otherwise prescribe, he shall indorse thereon the names of such
other witnesses as shall then be known to him: provided, however,
that the witnesses called by the state in rebuttal need not be
indorsed upon the information.
In State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 283, 647 P.2d 734, 739 (1982), the
Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that the state had a statutory duty,
pursuant to I.C. § 19-1302, “to disclose witnesses who are known to the
prosecution prior to the close of the state’s case in chief and whose testimony is
admissible during the state’s case in chief, regardless of whether they are
introduced in the state’s main case or in rebuttal.”

The Court rejected this

argument noting the statute’s specific exclusion of “rebuttal witnesses from the
endorsement requirement.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted “The
purpose of the endorsement requirement in I.C. s 19-1302 is essentially the
1

The Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, adopted in 1971 and effective
January 1, 1972, were the precursor to the Idaho Criminal Rules. See State v.
Goodrick, 95 Idaho 773, 777, 519 P.2d 958, 962 (1974).
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same as the purpose of I.C.R. 16(a)(vi), i.e., discovery by the defendant of the
names of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by
the state as witnesses.” Olsen, 103 Idaho at 283, 647 P.2d at 739. Subsequent
to Olsen, the Court of Appeals applied the principle that the state has no
obligation to disclose rebuttal witnesses to claims raised under I.C.R. 16(b)(6).2
See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 106-107, 685 P.2d 837, 847-848 (Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Olsen, supra, and I.C. § 19-1302) (“[T]here is no constitutional
duty nor any requirement under Rule 16(a), for the state to disclose potentially
inculpatory testimony of a rebuttal witness.”); State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 726, 739,
692 P.2d 370, 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Pierce, supra) (“The prosecutor’s duty
to disclose witnesses does not extend to persons called for rebuttal.”).
Relying on “the rule of law as it stands,” “that the State may call
undisclosed witnesses when the testimony of the witness only concerns the
chain of possession of certain evidence or during rebuttal,” the trial court denied
Montgomery’s request to exclude rebuttal witnesses Deputy Hart and Detective
Gillmore. (Tr., Vol. III, p.397, L.23 – p.399, L.16.) Montgomery cannot show that
the district court abused its discretion by following the law. Cf. State v. Leary,
2016 WL 3097264 *3 (Idaho June 1, 2016) (noting it is “difficult to understand
how the district court could have erred by failing to apply law that was not
enacted”).

2

The current version of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) contains the same language as Rule
16(a)(vi) of the Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, the precursor to the
Idaho Criminal Rules.
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Notwithstanding the rule that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed, the
district court also rejected Montgomery’s request for exclusion because
Montgomery failed to identify any prejudice. The district court explained:
Neither party can be expected to know all the vagaries of
trial, and in the absence of a showing of prejudice, which I haven’t
heard, there is no reason to exclude the testimony of rebuttal
witnesses, especially when the testimony is proper to rebut claims
made by the defendant himself.
(Tr., Vol. III, p.399, Ls.17-22.)
On appeal, Montgomery does not identify any error in the district court’s
ruling with respect to prejudice. Instead, Montgomery argues:
Both of the State’s non-disclosed witnesses were law
enforcement officers who worked on the case. One of the
witnesses had authored a report that had been previously
disclosed. (Tr., [Vol. III,] p.391, Ls.18-23.) Presumably, neither
witness was unknown to the State prior the start of trial.
When a party has failed to comply with discovery, the trial
court may impose sanctions, including the exclusion of a witness.
Mr. Montgomery asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed the State to present non-disclosed witnesses on
rebuttal. He maintains that exclusion of the witnesses was the
proper sanction for the violation.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14 (case and rule citations omitted).)
This is not a claim of prejudice. A showing of prejudice resulting from an
alleged late disclosure of witnesses “ordinarily requires that the complaining party
demonstrate that the late disclosure hampered his ability to meet the evidence at
trial, had a deleterious effect on his trial strategy, or that it deprived him of the
opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence.” State v.
Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations
omitted). Noting that the rebuttal witnesses were “presumably” known to the
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state prior to trial does not address, much less demonstrate, that “the late
disclosure hampered [Montgomery’s] ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a
deleterious effect on his trial strategy, or . . . deprived him of the opportunity to
raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence.” Because Montgomery
has failed to challenge the district court’s finding that he failed to identify any
prejudice that would warrant exclusion, this Court should affirm the denial of
Montgomery’s request for exclusion on this unchallenged basis.

State v.

Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a
basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal, appellate court will
affirm on the unchallenged basis).
Even if Montgomery’s appellate argument could be construed as
challenging the district court’s ruling on a preserved claim of prejudice related to
the timing of the disclosure of the state’s rebuttal witnesses, Montgomery has
failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion by not excluding the
testimony of Deputy Hart and Detective Gillmore. A party seeking the exclusion
of evidence as a sanction for a discovery violation must establish prejudice. Roe
v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996). “Where a latedisclosed witness has been allowed to testify despite an untimely disclosure, [the
appellate court] will not reverse a conviction in the absence of a showing that the
delay prejudiced the defendant’s preparation or presentation of his defense.”
Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586, 199 P.3d at 161; see also Olsen, 103 Idaho at 283,
647 P.2d at 739 (citations omitted) (“Where the question is one of late disclosure
rather than failure to disclose, the inquiry on appeal is whether the lateness of the

10

disclosure so prejudiced the defendant’s preparation or presentation of his
defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair
trial.”).
To the extent Montgomery has claimed prejudice, it is based on the
presumption that both witnesses were known to the State prior to the start of trial.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) Setting aside the fact that appellate courts generally do
not decide issues based on presumptions, whether the state was aware of the
witnesses prior to trial falls far short of demonstrating prejudice.

This is

especially true since Montgomery was also actually aware of at least one of the
witnesses – Detective Gillmore – given Montgomery’s acknowledgement that
Detective Gillmore prepared a report for the case. (Tr., Vol. III, p.391, Ls.18-23,
p.395, Ls.18-21.) Moreover, it is unclear how Montgomery can argue prejudice
without addressing the content of the challenged testimony, which he has not
done. (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) A review of that testimony in relation to the
evidence presented at trial shows no prejudice.
Deputy Hart was called for the purpose of rebutting Montgomery’s claim
that he acted in self-defense because he was supposedly injured by Camacho
when Montgomery stood in front of Camacho’s car to try and prevent Camacho
from leaving.

Specifically, Deputy Hart, who booked Montgomery into jail,

testified that Montgomery denied any injuries, and answered “good” in response
to the booking question about his health status and Montgomery. (Tr., Vol. III,
p.410, L.5 – p.411, L.5.) This testimony was similar to the rebuttal testimony
from Officer Nielsen, which was admitted without objection, that Montgomery did
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not mention any injuries related to the incident when Officer Nielsen interacted
with him at the time of Montgomery’s arrest. (Tr., Vol. III, p.368, L.3 – p.372,
L.24.) How Montgomery was prejudiced by Deputy Hart’s testimony regarding
answers Montgomery himself provided at booking is unclear.
Any prejudice related to the rebuttal testimony of Detective Gillmore is
likewise unclear.

Detective Gillmore testified in order to rebut Montgomery’s

claim that law enforcement recovered all five of the bullets Montgomery fired
from his gun; specifically, Detective Gillmore testified that he only found two
bullets. (Tr., Vol. III, p.420, Ls.13-14.) Montgomery cannot, and has not, claimed
he was prejudiced by Detective Gillmore’s testimony, particularly since
Montgomery was provided Detective Gillmore’s report prior to trial. (Tr., Vol. III,
p.391, Ls.18-23, p.395, Ls.18-21.)
In addition, Montgomery never requested additional time or a continuance
in order to adequately respond to either Deputy Hart’s or Detective Gillmore’s
testimony. See Olsen, 103 Idaho at 284, 647 P.2d at 740 (“If the defendant was
surprised or prejudiced by the late disclosure, he should have moved for a
continuance.”); Goodrick, 95 Idaho at 777, 519 P.2d at 962 (“At no time did the
defendant seek a continuance of the trial, and he failed to show in what way he
was prejudiced.”).

His failure to do so belies his claim of prejudice.

Id.

Moreover, a discovery sanction such as exclusion is imposed to “encourag[e]
compliance with discovery” and to “punish[ ] misconduct.” State v. Wilson, 158
Idaho 585, 588, 349 P.3d 439, 442 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Roe, 129 Idaho at 667,
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931 P.2d at 661). It is difficult to fathom how either purpose is served when the
timing of the disclosure comported with “the rule of law as it stands.”
Montgomery has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
following the law or by declining his request for exclusion in the absence of any
showing of prejudice in Montgomery’s preparation for trial or in the presentation
of his defense.3
E.

Should This Court Address The Requirements Of I.C.R. 16(b)(6)
Notwithstanding Montgomery’s Failure To Show The District Court Abused
Its Discretion By Following The Law Or By Declining Montgomery’s
Requested Sanction In The Absence Of Prejudice, Montgomery’s
Assertion That The Rule Requires Disclosure Of Rebuttal Witnesses Fails
Montgomery does not dispute that Idaho’s appellate courts have held that

I.C.R. 16 does not require the prosecutor to disclose rebuttal witnesses.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)

Instead, Montgomery contends the Court should

conclude that those cases “are either not biding [sic] precedent or must be
overturned.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) In support of this contention, Montgomery
relies, as he did below, on a footnote from the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Wilson, 158 Idaho at 589 n.2, 349 P.3d at 443 n.2. That footnote reads:
3

Montgomery also asserts the state will “be unable to prove that the admission
of the non-disclosed rebuttal witnesses is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.15.) It is unclear that a separate harmless error analysis is
warranted in addition to the prejudice analysis associated with whether exclusion
was the proper sanction. In the event a separate analysis is required, the state
submits any error is harmless for the same reasons Montgomery was not
prejudiced by the rebuttal testimony about which he complains. In addition, with
respect to Detective Gillmore’s testimony regarding the number of bullets
recovered, there was no reasonable possibility that this testimony contributed to
Montgomery’s conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle, I.C. § 18-3317, in
light of Montgomery’s admission to firing several shots at Camacho’s car with the
intent of disabling it, and the video showing the same. (Tr., Vol. II, p.327, Ls.1421; Exhibit B at 47:17-48:16.)
13

The State argues on appeal that limiting the State to using the
bartender's testimony only in rebuttal “cured” its discovery violation
because the State does not have a duty to disclose rebuttal
witnesses under I.C.R. 16(b)(6). We do not decide the merits of this
contention, but note that I.C.R. 16(b)(6) contains no express
exception for rebuttal witnesses. The State's argument is reliant
upon a series of Idaho decisions stating broadly that the
prosecutor's duty to disclose witnesses does not extend to persons
called for rebuttal. See, e.g., State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 739,
202 P.3d 1282, 1285 (Ct. App. 2009); Queen v. State, 146 Idaho
502, 504, 198 P.3d 731, 733 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Dye, 124
Idaho 250, 253, 858 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Lopez,
107 Idaho 726, 739, 692 P.2d 370, 383 (Ct. App. 1984). However,
that line of authority seems to trace back to State v. Olsen, 103
Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982), which was applying the terms of a
then-existing statute, I.C. § 19–1302. At that time, the statute
required the prosecuting attorney to endorse on any information
charging a felony the names of all witnesses known to the
prosecutor at the time of the filing of the information, but also
included a proviso “that the witnesses called by the state in rebuttal
need not be endorsed upon the information.” See Olsen, 103 Idaho
at 283, 647 P.2d at 739. In Olsen, the Court resolved against the
defendant his claim that I.C. § 19–1302 required disclosure of a
State's rebuttal witness; the Court did not address whether the
then-existing criminal rule, in the circumstances of that case,
required such disclosure. An amendment to section 19–1302 in
1989 removed the requirement that the names of witnesses be
endorsed on the information and the accompanying proviso. 1989
Idaho Sess. Laws 867. After the adoption of the Idaho Criminal
Rules in 1972, with the language now found in I.C.R. 16(b)(6), the
first case to state that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed by
the prosecution was State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 106–07, 685
P.2d 837, 847–48 (Ct. App. 1984), but for that proposition the court
cited only Olsen, a case that did not address the discovery
obligations imposed by I.C.R. 16(b)(6). Then Lopez carried forward
that proposition, citing only Pierce. Subsequent cases indicating
that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed in discovery cite
Lopez, without actual analysis of whether the language of Rule
16(b)(6) requires disclosure of rebuttal witnesses that are
contemplated in advance of trial.
Id.
The Wilson footnote accurately outlines the relevant case law and the
amendment to I.C. § 19-1302 eliminating the endorsement requirement, including
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the rebuttal witness exception. The amendment to I.C. § 19-1302 does not,
however, undermine the continuing viability of the rebuttal exception to witness
disclosure. As noted in Olsen, “[t]he purpose of the endorsement requirement in
I.C. s 19-1302 is essentially the same as the purpose of I.C.R. 16(a)(vi), i.e.,
discovery by the defendant of the names of all persons having knowledge of
relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses.” 103 Idaho at 283,
647 P.2d at 739. In light of the similarity of purpose, it is not surprising that I.C.R.
16(b)(6) (formerly I.C.R. 16(a)(vi)) would be interpreted as not requiring
disclosure of rebuttal witnesses. That I.C. § 19-1302 was amended in 1989 to
eliminate the endorsement requirement altogether does not mean the exception
for rebuttal witnesses fell by the wayside. In fact, the Statement of Purpose
accompanying the amendment indicates the statute was amended “[b]ecause of
the advent of modern discovery procedures under Criminal Rule 16,” which
rendered the statutory requirement unnecessary.

RS 22671 Statement of

Purpose (emphasis added). Although the criminal rule was not also amended to
expressly include an exception for rebuttal witnesses, no amendment was
needed given that the exception had already been expressly recognized in
relation to I.C.R. 16. Pierce, 107 Idaho at 106-107, 685 P.2d at 847-848; Lopez,
107 Idaho at 739, 692 P.2d at 383; see J&M Cattle Co., LLC v. Farmers Nat’l
Bank, 156 Idaho 690, 695-696, 330 P.3d 1048, 1053-1054 (2014) (citation
omitted) (court assumes legislature “aware of all other statutes and legal
precedent at the time the statute was passed”). The Court was surely aware in
deciding those cases that the language of the rule did not have an express
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exception for rebuttal witnesses as did the statute, and chose to construe the
language of the rule as providing the same exception regardless.

The plain

language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) supports that construction.
Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, the appellate
court must give effect to the rule as written, without engaging in construction.
State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State
v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132
Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389,
3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000)).

The plain language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) only

requires the disclosure of the names of witnesses “who may be called by the
state” at trial.

“May” is “used to indicate possibility or probability.”

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/may.

Thus, the state must only

disclose the names of witnesses it will probably or possibly call in order to meet
its burden of proof. Logic dictates that it does not, and could not, include rebuttal
witnesses because rebuttal witnesses, by their very nature, are “evidence which
explains, repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence which has been introduced
by or on behalf of the adverse party.” State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 655, 873
P.2d 905, 909 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Sorrell, 116 Idaho 966, 968, 783
P.2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1989)). More specifically, in the context of a criminal
case, it is “evidence offered by the prosecution to contradict the evidence in the
defendant’s case-in-chief.” State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d
1282, 1285 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Lopez, 107 Idaho at 739, 692 P.2d at 383).
A rule that would require the state to disclose rebuttal witnesses prior to trial
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would preclude the state from responding to evidence presented in the defense’s
case-in-chief for which the state had no notice. Although I.C.R. 16(c)(3) requires
the defense, upon written request, to “furnish the state a list of names and
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial,” there is no
requirement that the defendant disclose the subject matter of the witnesses’
testimony, unless the witness is an expert, I.C.R. 16(c)(4), and the state certainly
could not compel a criminal defendant to provide advance notice of his or her
expected testimony. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60, 253 P.3d 727, 734
(2011) (state and federal constitutions “guarantee a criminal defendant the right
not to be compelled to testify against himself”).
Even if prior precedent holding that the state is not required to disclose the
names of rebuttal witnesses is not binding because the precedent relates back to
a case discussing a defendant’s statutory right under I.C. § 19-1302, the plain
language of I.C.R. 16(b)(6) and logic support the conclusion that the rule does
not require such disclosure.

For this same reason, if the prior precedent is

binding, Montgomery has failed to show any basis for overruling any of those
cases.

State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)

(“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”).
Montgomery has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the district
court’s denial of his request to exclude the testimony of two of the state’s rebuttal
witnesses.
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II.
Montgomery Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During
His Rebuttal Closing Argument, Much Less That The Prosecutor’s Rebuttal
Argument Amounted To Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Montgomery claims, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor

committed misconduct during closing argument by asserting that certain
witnesses, including Montgomery, lied when they testified. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.15-30.)

According to Montgomery, the alleged misconduct amounts to

fundamental error and, even if it does not, he asks this Court to vacate his
conviction and remand for a new trial as punishment for a “pattern of repetitious
misconduct” by the Kootenai County Prosecutor’s Office.

(Appellant’s Brief,

pp.15-34.) Application of the correct legal standards to Montgomery’s allegations
shows Montgomery has failed to meet his burden of showing error, much less
fundamental error, and Montgomery’s request to vacate his conviction despite his
failure to meet his burden is contrary to law.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor,
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental
error. Id.

18

C.

Montgomery Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Prosecutor’s Rebuttal
Closing Argument, Much Less Fundamental Error
For the first time on appeal, Montgomery asserts that the prosecutor

committed misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.15-29.) Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of constitutional error are
reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of this test to
the facts of this case shows Montgomery has failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating any error in the prosecutor’s closing argument, let alone
fundamental error.
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Montgomery to
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Montgomery cannot satisfy the first prong because the prosecutor’s comments
were not improper.
Montgomery’s criminal conduct was captured on video from surveillance
cameras installed in Montgomery’s neighbor’s house. (Exhibits 8, 9; Tr., Vol. II,
pp.198-209 (Montgomery’s neighbor, Brian Beeler, laying foundation for video
footage).) Those surveillance videos, admitted at trial as Exhibits 8 and 9, were,
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in important ways, inconsistent with the version Montgomery gave to Detective
Schmitz after the incident (Exhibit B), and inconsistent with the version given by a
number of witnesses Montgomery called in his defense.
Defense counsel started her closing argument by asserting:
Swooping, zooming, wheeling, crash, and loud. Those are
the testimony [sic] and those are the words that we heard in that
testimony in relation to the way that Jeep was driving when it
entered Kaleigh Court. And, quite frankly, I got tired of the
redundancy of that testimony. We heard it over and over and over
again. We heard it from Kyle, we heard it from Sai, we heard it
from Maddie, we heard it from Cory, and we heard it from Macey.
But the reason why we heard that so much is because it’s
important, and the reason it’s important is because that is not on
the video, on any of the videos that you’re going to see this
afternoon, if you choose to watch them again. That is what
precedes the decisions that Dan [Montgomery] made that day.
Those statements are underscored by the evidence of the
testimony that came in relation to where the tread was left in
Kaleigh Court, that there’s tire marks going through the yard of
someone’s home, that there’s tire tread outside of someone’s home
at the end of that cul-de-sac. And that is important when we start to
pass judgment on Dan.
(Tr., Vol. III, p.455, L.9 – p.456, L.4.)
Defense counsel then claimed the state tried to “simplify” its burden of
proof with respect to Montgomery’s claims that he acted out of necessity, in selfdefense, or in defense of another, and asked the jury to minimize the
inconsistencies between what Montgomery told law enforcement shortly after the
incident and what he testified to at trial after the videos were played, which
contradicted his prior version of events:
It’s not as straightforward as the State wants you to think, because
Dan [Montgomery] talked to you guys and he got up there and he
tried to explain to you what happened a year ago, over a year ago,
and he did it with the hindsight that a year brings.
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Does his consistency change to a certain extent?
Absolutely. I don’t think anybody is going to get up here and
tell you the exact same story twice, unless they’re practiced
speakers, but that’s not who Dan is. What we saw on that video
with Detective Schmitz was the first version of events as Dan was
trying to recall them not even an hour after the event occurred. He
had not had time to process, he had not had time to focus. He
didn’t have time to even assess his medical condition. But what he
has done is tried to explain to you what he was thinking on that
date, what he was worried about, and why he was worried about it.
(Tr., Vol. III, p.456, L.5 – p.457, L.10; see R., pp.202-204 (jury instructions on
self-defense, defense of another, and necessity).)
Defense counsel then characterized the videos as “a very clinical view of
what occurred” and a “very limited view” (Tr., Vol. III, p.457, Ls.20-22), and asked
the jurors to put themselves “in the position” of Montgomery and find that he “was
indeed acting in self-defense when he fired his weapon and in defense of the
others that were clearly located there in that cul-de-sac” (Tr., Vol. III, p.458, L.25
– p.459, L.16).
In response to defense counsel’s closing argument, the prosecutor told
the jury: “when you see evidence and you hear evidence, you have to judge its
credibility. When a witness takes the stand, you have to decide whether or not
they’re [sic] lying.” (Tr., Vol. III, p.461, Ls.6-9.) The prosecutor then explained
why the jury should find that several defense witnesses were not credible in light
of what was depicted on the video:
You heard some testimony, some of Mr. Montgomery’s
witnesses took the stand. Mr. Kyle Decker took the stand. He said
that [Montgomery] was acting calm and collected. There’s no
change in that. [Montgomery] was acting calm and collected the
entire time.
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He said [Montgomery] had the gun holstered and he only
drew it after Mr. Camacho got back in the vehicle.
That’s not what you saw on the video. Mr. Kyle Decker is
not to be believed. He lied to you. That’s not what you saw in the
video.
Mr. Decker also said, well, you know, the driver got out
walked towards Mr. Montgomery. I said, well, was he doing
aggressively? No, he was doing it reluctantly. Reluctantly
someone’s got a gun pointed at him. Someone just told him,
the fuck out of the car. Yeah, he was walking out reluctantly.

and
that
like
Get

Sai Wills took the stand and testified for Mr. Montgomery.
The gun was not drawn until after the vehicle stopped. That’s not
what you saw in the video. She lied to you.
Cory Megis testified the gun was holstered. He only drew
the gun after the driver got back in the car. That’s not what you
saw in the video. He lied to you, too.
Mr. Montgomery’s wife took the stand and lied to you. She
said she thought he got run over. Did you see how fast that car
was moving or how slow it was moving when it bumped into Dan,
Mr. Montgomery? How could a reasonable person think that’s
getting run over?
When did you hear the vehicle speed up? After the first shot
was fired. Why would anybody stick around that long after a gun
has been fired? And where was Mr. Montgomery? Moving to the
side of the vehicle. How could he have gotten run over?
(Tr., Vol. III, p.460, L.10 – p.461, L.20.) The prosecutor then replayed the videos
for the jury and discussed, in detail, what the videos showed. (Tr., Vol. III, p.461,
L.21 – p.465, L.15.)
The prosecutor also addressed Montgomery’s changed version of events:
Ladies and gentlemen, you heard Mr. Montgomery lie to you.
He told the officers, I didn’t pull the gun out, I wasn’t afraid until the
driver got back in the car, that’s when I started having fear.
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Well, if that’s when he started having fear, then why did he
pull the gun out to stop the car? Why? Why did he change his
story after he sees the video and what really happened?
His witnesses testified inconsistently with what you saw on
the video. Dan [Montgomery] told the officers inconsistently with
what was on the video until after he saw it in court. Then he
changes his story. And why did he tell you?
Well, I knew my neighbor had a video, I knew it was being
taped, and I knew if I was saying anything that wasn’t true, you
guys would just figure out what you saw on [the] video anyway.
(Tr., Vol. III, p.467, Ls.6-22.)
As noted, Montgomery did not object to any of the foregoing arguments
made by the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing, but he claims on appeal that
the arguments were improper because, he asserts, they “encroach[ed] upon the
jury’s function to make credibility determinations” by “malign[ing]” Montgomery’s
testimony and his witnesses’ testimony by characterizing the testimony as lying.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18 (capitalization altered).) Montgomery further argues, for
the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor “crossed the line by inserting his
personal view of the evidence, including the pervasive offering of the
prosecutor’s opinion that defense witnesses were lying.”

(Appellant’s Brief,

p.25.) Montgomery’s arguments are without merit.
The entire point of the prosecutor’s closing argument is to articulate the
state’s view of the evidence, and doing so does not mean the prosecutor
impermissibly inserted his “opinion,” vouched for the state’s witnesses, or
committed any other error. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 480
(Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor has “considerable latitude in closing argument” and
is “entitled to discuss fully . . . the evidence and the inferences to be drawn
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therefrom”).

Moreover, a prosecutor may, in fact, "express an opinion in

argument as to the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when
such an opinion is based upon the evidence." State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,
288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,
14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (While a prosecutor may not “express a
personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence,”
a prosecutor may “express how, from [the prosecutor’s] perspective, the
evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses.”). The
prosecutor’s “opinion” in this case that several witnesses lied about the
circumstances surrounding Montgomery’s actions was “based upon the
evidence,” i.e., the videos of what actually happened.

Nevertheless,

Montgomery asks this Court to draw a different inference than the one drawn by
the prosecutor, arguing that the “inconsistencies between the testimony offered
and the facts as shown by State’s Exhibits 8 and 9” could have been the result of
faulty memories as opposed

to

lying.

(Appellant’s Brief,

pp.24-25.)

Montgomery’s preference for this inference over the inference that the witnesses
lied falls far short of establishing a constitutional violation. The state does not
have to present its arguments in the light most favorable to the defendant or
presume the truth of any “innocent explanation” offered for an inconsistent
statement. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003)
(citation omitted) (“Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.”);
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cf. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012) (citations
omitted) (“the existence of alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily
negate reasonable suspicion”). So long as the evidence supports the inferences
made by the prosecutor, the prosecutor’s arguments are not objectionable.
Compare Priest, 128 Idaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632 (“In the context in which the
challenged statements were made, it is apparent that the prosecutor was merely
analyzing the evidence bearing upon witnesses’ credibility and stating the
conclusions which he urged the jury to draw therefrom.”). That standard was
satisfied in this case.
Exhibits 8 and 9 showed that Montgomery drew his weapon and aimed it
at Camacho’s car as soon as Camacho turned around in the cul-de-sac and
started driving back toward Montgomery. However, Kyle Decker, Sai Wills, and
Cory Megis all testified that Montgomery did not draw his weapon until after
Camacho got back in the car after stopping and getting out to talk to
Montgomery. (Tr., Vol. II, p.286, Ls.3-6 (Decker testifying that he remembered
Montgomery “pulling the gun out as soon as he was in front of the vehicle, when
the driver had gotten back into the vehicle and started accelerating towards him
after he was telling him not to go forward”); p.295, L.24 – p.296, L.1 (Wills
testifying that Montgomery “had to quickly jump out of the way of the vehicle, and
that is when he pulled the firearm and had shot into the vehicle at that time”);
p.300, Ls.19-25 (Wills denying that Montgomery had his gun out “at any point
before” the “car lunged forward towards him”); p.311, L.20 – p.312, L.7 (Megis
testifying that Montgomery did not pull his gun out of the holster until after the
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driver got back in his car).) Suspiciously, this is the same story Montgomery told
Detective Schmitz shortly after the event.

(See Exhibit B at 41:30-41:58

(Montgomery claiming his gun was still holstered when Camacho came back and
stopped in front of him), 46:23 – 46:41 (Montgomery claiming he drew his gun
after Camacho got back in his car and started “rolling forward”).) And, it is the
version of events most favorable to Montgomery in relation to his proffered
defenses. (See R., pp.202-204 (defense instructions).) From the prosecution’s
standpoint, it was a fair inference, based on the evidence presented, that the
defense witnesses were not being truthful when they testified, contrary to the
videos, that Montgomery did not draw his weapon until after Camacho got back
in his car. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969.
It was also fair for the prosecutor to infer that Montgomery’s wife, Sonia,
was not being truthful when she testified that she thought Camacho ran over
Montgomery.

Although the defense presented a video from Montgomery’s

daughter’s cell phone reflecting that Sonia screamed after the shots were fired
and said Montgomery got “run over,” which her daughter assured her did not
happen (Exhibit A), Sonia’s trial testimony on this point was subject to an
inference that she was not being entirely truthful. On direct examination, Sonia
testified that she saw the car “make contact” with Montgomery and she “thought
he died.” (Tr., Vol. II, p.250, Ls.16-22.)

Sonia also testified the car started

“slow,” but was “going fast enough to hit” Montgomery and she said she thought
Montgomery got run over “[b]ecause he was in front of a drunk driver.” (Tr., Vol.
II, p.260, L.7 – p.261, L.1.) Sonia also admitted that, on the night of the crime,
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she told a police officer Camacho “just punched it” even though that was not true,
but explained she said that because she “was very upset that night” and “had a
lot of adrenaline.” (Tr., Vol. II, p.262, Ls.9-19.) As the prosecutor noted in his
rebuttal closing, the surveillance video showed there was no reasonable
interpretation of the events that would support a claim that Camacho ran over
Montgomery.
Because the prosecutor’s assertion that several witnesses lied was based
on a fair inference from the evidence presented, the question is whether use of
some form of the word “lie” results in a constitutional violation for purposes of the
fundamental error test. It does not. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77
(Ct. App. 2011), is instructive.
In Norton, the defendant “argue[d] that the ‘liar lying theme was
misconduct,” and contended “that because she ‘never testified that she had lied
in connection with this case,’ the ‘argument that she was lying was improper.’”
151 Idaho at 188, 254 P.3d at 89. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:
The prosecutor did make several references in opening, closing,
and rebuttal to a lie. The lie that he was referring to was the fact
that both Norton and Stacy insisted that Stacy was in Pierce
between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of the fire. The thrust
of the prosecutor’s argument was the fact that Norton continued to
insist that Stacy was at her house in Kamiah when she knew that
he was in Pierce setting that house on fire. The prosecutor’s
arguments in this regard do not constitute misconduct.
Moreover, Norton did testify that she had lied in connection with the
case, specifically about the timeframe that the prosecutor
continually referenced. Norton admitted on cross-examination that
she lied to Sergeant Jared about Stacy’s whereabouts during the
timeframe between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. While she maintained that
he was obtaining marijuana for her during that time, the fact
remains that she lied. The prosecutor was free to argue the
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evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from that
evidence.
Norton, 151 Idaho at 188, 254 P.3d at 89 (emphasis added).
As in Norton, the fact remains that Exhibits 8 and 9 disproved Decker’s,
Wills’, Megis’, and Sonia’s testimony, and it was not misconduct for the
prosecutor to argue the fair inference that those witnesses were lying. The same
is true for Montgomery’s testimony. While Montgomery did not admit he lied, he
acknowledged that the video of the incident belied his pre-trial claim to Detective
Schmitz that he did not draw his weapon until after Camacho got back in his car.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.333, L.10 – p.335, L.3.) That Montgomery claimed his statement to
Detective Schmitz was false “because [he] wasn’t sure of the sequence of
events, but [he] knew it was going to be on video” (Tr., Vol. II, p.334, L.24 –
p.335, L.3), is not only inconsistent with the certainty of his statements during his
interview with Detective Schmitz, Montgomery’s attempt to explain the
inconsistency is irrelevant to whether it was a fair inference for the prosecutor to
characterize his statement as a lie.

As the Supreme Court recognized in

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000): “Allowing comment upon the fact
that a defendant’s presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity
to tailor his testimony is appropriate—and indeed, given the inability to sequester
the defendant, sometimes essential—to the central function of the trial, which is
to discover the truth.” The inference that Montgomery lied was fair, supported by
the evidence, and did not constitute misconduct that could form the basis of an
alleged constitutional violation. See Norton, supra; see also State v. Ehrlick, 158
Idaho 900, 928, 354 P.3d 462, 490 (2015) (not misconduct for prosecutor to use
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the word “lies,” “lied,” and “lying” in relation to defendant’s statements because
doing so was fair comment on defendant’s credibility based on the evidence);
State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627, 262 P.3d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 2011) (not
misconduct to assail defendant’s credibility by noting defendant “had time to think
about and plan her testimony”); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18-19, 189 P.3d
477, 480-481 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Generally, it may be improper to label the
defendant as a ‘liar,’ for testimony given in his or her defense.

It is not

misconduct, however, to refer to the defendant as a liar if the defendant admitted
to lying in connection with the case.”); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716, 85
P.3d 1109, 1115 (Ct. App. 2003) (prosecutor “permissibly argued that the reason
there were inconsistencies in Kuhn’s testimony was because he had lied under
oath,” although improper to call defendant a “liar and thief”); State v. Lovelass,
133 Idaho 160, 169, 983 P.2d 233, 242 (Ct. App. 1999) (although “troubled by
the prosecutor’s less than artful comments,” which included allegations of “lying”
and “fabricat[ing]” evidence, the comments fell “within the broad range of fair
comment on the evidence rather than express a personal belief”; “[a]t the very
least,” the comments did “not constitute fundamental error”).
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged
error is “clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(footnote omitted). Montgomery cannot satisfy this element because he cannot
show from the appellate record any error, much less error that is “clear or
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obvious.” Nor has he demonstrated that the failure to object to the prosecutor’s
argument was anything but a tactical decision.

Montgomery’s argument

otherwise centers around his assertion that “it cannot be a tactical decision on
the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not based on the evidence
and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented through misconduct.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.27.) The flaw in this argument is that it is based on the false
premise that the prosecutor in this case could not argue the inference, based on
the evidence presented, that certain witnesses lied. Moreover, whether appellate
counsel believes a certain statement is objectionable does not mean trial
counsel’s decision not to object was not tactical.

It is well-within counsel’s

tactical decision-making authority to decline to object during closing argument,
especially when the prosecutor’s statements are a fair inference based on the
evidence.

See United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999)

(counsel’s decision not to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument “falls within
the range of permissible conduct of trial counsel”).
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Montgomery to
“demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if Montgomery could overcome
the first two prongs of the fundamental error analysis, he has not and cannot
show the error affected his substantial rights. Montgomery claims otherwise,
arguing the “real question” in this case “was not whether [he] fired shots into an
occupied vehicle, but whether he did so in defense of himself or others.”
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(Appellant’s Brief, p.28.) In support of this argument, Montgomery contends:
“Evidence regarding how Mr. Montgomery and others present perceived the
situation and danger was central to the self-defense question.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.29.) It is unclear how this argument even relates to the alleged misconduct.
The prosecutor’s comments about which Montgomery complains were that the
witnesses lied about when Montgomery drew his weapon, they were not about
how they “perceived the situation and danger.”

Moreover, the prosecutor’s

comments did nothing more than highlight what was readily apparent, which was
that the witnesses’ testimony was contradicted by the videos. Montgomery’s
claim that the prosecutor’s statements “could have swayed the jury” in evaluating
the evidence is without merit.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.29.)

What undoubtedly

swayed the jury was what it saw on the video, which displayed the events as they
unfolded. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury’s verdict, which
included an acquittal on the aggravated assault charge (R., p.214), was the
product of it ignoring the instruction that it was the sole judge of credibility (R.,
p.184), or ignoring the instruction that the prosecutor’s arguments were not
evidence (R., p.192). Indeed, the presumption is that the jury followed such
instructions and rendered its verdict based solely on the evidence presented.
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (citation omitted) (“Idaho
appellate courts also presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given.”).
Montgomery’s contrary claim fails, and to the extent the Court finds constitutional
error in the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing, any error was harmless.
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Montgomery next argues that, even if each of the instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct did not amount individually to reversible error, “the
accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated her [sic] right
to a fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial” under the doctrine of
cumulative error.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.29.)

Montgomery’s cumulative error

argument fails because the cumulative error analysis does not include errors
neither objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at
982. Because Montgomery did not object to any of the alleged misconduct and
because none of the prosecutor’s statements amounted to fundamental error,
there is no error to cumulate.
Finally, Montgomery asks this Court to vacate his conviction even if he did
not meet his burden of showing fundamental error because, he contends, “the
Kootenai County Prosecutor’s Office has exhibited a pattern of repetitious
misconduct.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.31 (punctuation altered).) The Court should
decline Montgomery’s invitation to do so because his request is contrary to law.
The law imposes upon Montgomery the burden of showing that the error
of which he complains in this case is fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224-225,
245 P.3d at 975-976. The law does not allow him to forego that burden in the
name of punishing a prosecutorial agency that he believes has “repeatedly
cross[ed] the line,” particularly without regard to whether the individual prosecutor
in his case has ever “crossed the line,” and without regard to the nature of the
claimed misconduct.

“The relevant question is whether the prosecutors'

comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction
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a denial of due process.”

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986)

(citation and quotations omitted). Absent such a showing, which Montgomery
has not made, reversal of his conviction is unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon Montgomery’s conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm into an
occupied vehicle.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2016.
/s/ Jessica M. Lorello______________
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Deputy Attorney General
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